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NONJURISDICTIONALITY OR INEQUITY 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch* 
In response to Professor Scott Dodson’s essay, Jurisdictionality and 
Bowles v. Russell,1 imagine this:  “Go ahead, take a ten day vacation,” says 
your boss.  When you return on the tenth day, a pink-slip awaits.  Per com-
pany policy, your boss fired you for being absent for more than eight days.  
This is what happened in Bowles v. Russell.2  Except that it wasn’t a job, a 
boss, or a company policy; it was a life prison sentence, a federal district 
court judge, and a court order.3  And what the order said was this:  file your 
notice of appeal within seventeen days.4  Bowles filed within sixteen.  Too 
late said the Supreme Court; regardless of the calculation error, the court of 
appeals had no jurisdiction after the fourteen-day deadline in Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6).5 
Jurisdictional limits hold the key to the courthouse door.  The 5–4 ma-
jority opinion in Bowles reasoned that because Congress set the fourteen-
day deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), as opposed to a deadline created by 
rule only, Rule 4(a)(6) was “mandatory and jurisdictional”6 and could not 
be equitably extended.7  This decision departs from recent precedent desig-
nating deadlines as nonjurisdictional.8  Professor Dodson’s essay navigates 
a path between Justice Thomas’s majority opinion and Justice Souter’s dis-
sent by embracing Thomas’s use of “mandatory” and Souter’s argument for 
deeming appellate deadlines “nonjurisdictional.”9  This alternative dovetails 
with the Court’s recent precedent clarifying time lines as nonjurisdictional, 
but still allows Thomas to reach the same result.  And it is more elegant, 
 
*  Assistant Professor, Cumberland School of Law.  My thanks to Scott Dodson for inviting me to 
comment on his piece. 
1  Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42 (2007), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/21/ (link). 
2  127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007) (link). 
3  Id. at 2362 (“The jury sentenced Bowles to 15 years to life imprisonment.”). 
4  Apparently when Paul Mancino, Jr., Keith Bowles’s attorney, asked the judge why he gave him an 
incorrect deadline, he replied that he was allowed to add three-day extensions for the mail rule in other 
cases, so he extended it here as well.  Tony Mauro, Opinion Shows High Court’s Ideological Divide, 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 18, 2007, at 4. 
5  Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2363–66; FED. R. APP. P. 4(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c).   
6  Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2363. 
7  Id. at 2366. 
8  See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (link). 
9  Dodson, supra note 1, at 42–43. 
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perhaps sparing courts some of the burdens and confusion left by the major-
ity opinion. 
But the “mandatory” designation misses the point:  we are still left 
holding the pink-slip and Bowles is still without an appeal.  Dodson ex-
plains that, by depicting the time limit as mandatory, the litigant who 
“wishes to enforce it . . . need only speak up in a timely manner, and the 
court is obligated to enforce the limit even if it is inequitable to do so.”10  
Consequently, “because Russell’s appellate brief to the Sixth Circuit in-
voked the untimeliness of Bowles’s notice of appeal, characterizing the rule 
as mandatory would preclude applicability of the ‘unique circumstances’ 
doctrine and result in the same outcome.”11 
This Colloquy Post begins by canvassing the nonjurisdictional pro-
posal put forth by both Professor Dodson and Justice Souter.  Considering 
the systemic, equitable policies underlying Rule 4(a)(6) and the prototypical 
examples distinguishing jurisdictional rules (those delineating classes of 
cases) from nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules, this nonjurisdictional 
alternative makes sense.  It is the “mandatory” aspect of Professor 
Dodson’s proposal that concerns me; it leaves no room for equity absent the 
mercy of opposing counsel.  Part II thus analyzes the inequitable conse-
quences of labeling a rule either jurisdictional or mandatory.  Finally, Part 
III concludes by commenting on Justice Thomas’s appeal to Congress for 
an equitable result. 
I. NONJURISDICTIONAL CASTING 
Justice Souter’s dissent maps a way out of the inequitable result in 
Bowles by labeling the appellate deadline nonjurisdictional without adding 
“mandatory” as a precursor.12  He reasons in his opening, “It is intolerable 
for the judicial system to treat people this way, and there is not even a tech-
nical justification for condoning this bait and switch.”13  With one more 
vote, Souter’s nonjurisdictional classification would facilitate the intuitively 
correct result.  It would also leave intact the Court’s recent efforts to clarify 
the “mandatory and jurisdictional” incantation. 
Professor Dodson likewise laments the break from recent, uniform 
precedent characterizing time limits as nonjurisdictional.  His criticism of 
Thomas’s use of “jurisdictional” is two-fold, targeting wasted judicial and 
litigant resources.  First, he observes that a sua sponte obligation to investi-
gate jurisdiction taxes judicial resources.14  Second, it permits a litigant two 
bites at the apple by rolling the dice—if she loses on the merits, she can 
 
10  Id. at 47. 
11  Posting of Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
civpro/ (July 9, 2007) (link). 
12  Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2367–69 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
13  Id. at 2367. 
14  Dodson, supra note 1, at 46. 
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then point out the jurisdictional defect.15  Of course, this is a double-edged 
sword.  The danger is that the other litigant could play the same game, 
which counsels a cautious approach. 
Dodson is right that Justice Thomas’s jurisdictional construction has 
these perverse effects.  But you might not recognize them from initially 
reading the majority opinion.  Thomas makes the jurisdictional issue sound 
clear cut—black or white, jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional.  But it is a rare 
case when a complex trope like jurisdiction is as easy as that.  And Bowles 
v. Russell is no exception, despite Thomas’s careful wording.  His majority 
opinion glides over hard precedent, shoehorning statutory time limits into 
the “mandatory and jurisdictional” “classes of cases” box alongside subject 
matter jurisdiction.16 
Neither statutory constructions nor, as Stephen Burbank observes, pro-
cedural rules are neutral, which makes it imperative to ferret out the rule’s 
impact and to candidly describe its motivations and purposes.17  The same 
is true for a jurisdictional designation.  Undertaking Professor Burbank’s 
task of discerning Rule 4(a)(6)’s impact requires a hard look at the policies 
underlying the rule.  Are these rules structural or systemic?  Whether the 
appellate deadline invokes systemic or structural values helps categorize it 
as either a rule that defines a class of cases (which is typically jurisdic-
tional) or a claim-processing rule (which is nonjurisdictional).18 
On one hand, nonjurisdictional claim-processing statutes of limitation 
are,19 as Alex Lees argues, “designed to promote fairness.  Equitable flexi-
bility is needed to help those rules adapt to circumstances where blind ap-
plication leads to unfairness.”20  These policies resemble those underlying 
Rule 4(a)(6)’s deadline and hint at the importance of litigants’ interests as 
opposed to structural interests.  Moreover, this appellate deadline is not a 
jurisdictional sorting classes-of-cases type rule like subject matter jurisdic-
tion.  It doesn’t appear to involve the same structural values that subject 
matter jurisdiction does.  What is more, strictly applying both statutes of 
limitation and time limits is more inequitable than strictly applying subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Litigants in the latter situation can simply refile in the 
proper court, whereas litigants in either of the former situations cannot ini-
tiate litigation anywhere.  Thus, properly understood, appeal periods pri-
marily concern the immediate litigants’ interests, not fundamental societal 
 
15  Id. 
16  Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2365–66; Dodson, supra note 1, at 44. 
17  Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch:  The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypoc-
risy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1925 (2006) (link).  
18  Dodson, supra note 1, at 44. 
19  See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006) (link) (finding that a statute of limitations de-
fense is not jurisdictional). 
20  Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label:  Use and Misuse, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1457, 1492 (2006) 
(link). 
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interests or structural values.  This approach counsels classifying the appel-
late deadline as a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. 
Professor Dodson’s approach is consistent with this one.  Describing 
jurisdictional policies, he observes, “[j]urisdiction generally is founded on 
structural values such as federalism, separation of powers, and limited na-
tional government, not the litigant and systemic values of efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, autonomy, predictability, and fairness.”21  He concludes, “ap-
peal periods involve primarily the interests of the litigants, not structural 
values.”22  Thus, the values underlying Rule 4(a)(6)’s appellate deadline are 
litigant related and include fairness.  Dodson, however, avoids the equitable 
policies flowing from that designation by invoking the “mandatory” no-
menclature.  This is, perhaps, where we part company. 
II. EQUITY’S “SLUMBER” 
The inequity in Bowles started innocently enough when the trial court 
transitioned to electronic filing.  During the switch, the clerk sent Bowles 
neither the original order overruling his motion to alter or amend judgment 
nor an order for a new trial date.23  Thus, Bowles did not know when his 
time for appeal started running.  The court found as much when granting his 
motion to reopen the appeal period and giving him seventeen days to file 
his notice of appeal.24  The judge’s seventeen-day deadline mishap occurred 
on top of the clerk’s original error, compounding the mistakes. 
The majority’s decision to label the judge’s miscalculation as jurisdic-
tional means that equity cannot enter the equation at all.  So Keith Bowles’s 
fate would also befall victims of other “unique circumstances” such as those 
in hurricane Katrina or the September 11 attacks.25  In those situations, it is 
both equitable and pragmatic to extend deadlines.  But the “jurisdictional” 
characterization does not, at least theoretically, give courts the flexibility to 
draw those lines.  Although Justice Thomas “see[s] no compelling reason to 
resurrect the [unique circumstances] doctrine from its 40-year slumber,”26 
the need is real.  The lesson resulting from Bowles seems to be that a 
stealthy, sloppy, or unfortunate court can rob litigants of an appeal. 
For litigants, appellate process is inherently part of procedural justice.27  
Appeals correct errors and enhance accuracy; “appeals, like trials, are a 
search for truth.”28  The Bowles majority opinion short-circuits this search 
 
21  Dodson, supra note 1, at 47. 
22  Id. 
23  Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). 
24  Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362. 
25  This “unique circumstances” exception is discussed in Bowles.  Id. at 2366. 
26  Id. 
27  See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 244–45 (2004) (link).  
28  United States v. Brown, 50 F.R.D. 110, 112 (D.D.C.), rev’d on other grounds, 428 F.2d 1100 
(D.C. Cir. 1970). 
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by wrongly assuming a version of John Rawls’s pure procedural justice.  In 
A Theory of Justice, Rawls aims to develop the idea of “justice as fair-
ness”—a concept missing from Bowles.29 
Rawls’s justice as fairness divides procedural justice into two compo-
nents:  substance-based procedural justice and pure procedural justice.30  
Substance-based procedural justice derives its meaning from substantive 
law and rests on an independent need for “distributive, corrective, restitu-
tive, or retributive justice” to dictate just outcomes.31  Unlike justice de-
pendent on substantively correct outcomes, pure procedural justice 
substitutes the fair outcome criterion for a fair procedure that assumes a cor-
rect outcome if properly implemented.32  Thus, pure procedural justice is 
unconcerned with the reality of substantively fair or unfair outcomes so 
long as a fair process is used. 
Justice Thomas follows this latter theory.  Strapping on the mantle of 
“mandatory and nonjurisdictional” assumes two things, both incorrect.  
First, it assumes that this trope is a fair procedure.  Second, it assumes that 
our processing system is one based on pure procedural justice.  It isn’t.  
Thus, both propositions fail.  If we had pure procedural justice there would 
be no need for appeals; the existence of that process concedes the reality of 
procedural imperfections.  “Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
are reactionary—that is, they were enacted to chase and enforce substantive 
norms—they cannot (for fear of losing efficiency and affordability) hope to 
assure a perfect outcome.”33  Thus, our system is one of imperfect substan-
tive-based procedural justice.  Still, the judicial system’s legitimacy hinges 
on procedural fairness and the truth-seeking mission of the appellate proc-
ess, so our aim should be to eradicate imperfections as much as possible.34  
In the Bowles context, this means that heralding form over substance—
eviscerating appellate process as Thomas does—undermines this goal. 
We are thus left with a warped view of “pure” process.  This much be-
comes clear when considering that the majority of habeas petitions are filed 
by pro se litigants.35  Courts generally afford these petitioners great leniency 
 
29  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
30  Id. at 85–87.  Rawls subdivides substance-based procedural justice into “perfect” and “imperfect” 
procedural justice.  Perfect procedural justice, requires “an independent criterion of what is a fair divi-
sion” and the ability “to devise a procedure that is sure to give that desired outcome.”  Id. at 85.  Imper-
fect procedural justice contains the same first criterion—a need for fair outcomes—but does not ensure 
that outcome.  Rawls observes in this regard, “it seems impossible to design the legal rules so that they 
always lead to the correct result.”  Id. at 85–86. 
31  MICHEL ROSENFELD, 4 PHILOSOPHY, SOCIAL THEORY, AND THE RULE OF LAW 67 (1998). 
32  RAWLS, supra note 29, at 86.  See also ROSENFELD, supra note 31, at 67; Solum, supra note 27, at 
239–40. 
33  Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good (manuscript at 16), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005021 (link). 
34  See Solum, supra note 27, at 245–46. 
35  See Brief of the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, Bowles v. Russell at 7, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007) (No. 06-5306), 2007 WL 185936 (“Such reliance 
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by construing their pleadings to avoid prejudice.36  Even the Supreme Court 
(during Justice Thomas’s term) recommended that federal courts ignore le-
gal labels used by pro se litigants to “avoid an unnecessary dismissal” or “to 
avoid inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling require-
ments.”37  The unforgiving stance in Bowles is therefore curious and dis-
heartening.  It is harsh to tell pro se litigants that they are wrong to rely on a 
federal judge’s words.  These litigants spend hours searching for the right 
incantation of magical legal jargon to unlock the door to process and their 
freedom.  While they are generally the most unsympathetic sort—often 
convicted murderers like Keith Bowles—they are entitled to the same proc-
ess as you and me. 
III. CONCLUSION: WAITING FOR CONGRESS? 
Those searching for a way around inequity might stumble upon an 
older use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).  Before Rule 4(a) 
was amended in 1991 to allow parties fourteen days to reopen the time for 
filing an appeal, some courts relied on Rule 60(b)(6) to avoid manifest in-
justice.38  Rule 60(b)(6) relieves a party from a final judgment for “any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”39  Thus, 
courts vacated and reentered judgments under this rule, restarting the ap-
peals timeline.  Still, any attempt to revive this practice to circumvent the 
result in Bowles would lead to further doctrinal confusion. 
But it is difficult to let Justice Thomas’s flat appeal to Congress suf-
fice.  He writes, “[i]f rigorous rules like the one applied today are thought to 
be inequitable, Congress may authorize courts to promulgate rules that ex-
cuse compliance with the statutory time limits.”40  But we may be waiting 
for nothing.  Limiting Bowles to its facts and, as Professor Dodson recom-
mends, relegating it to a corner within a broader jurisdictional framework 
may help.  In the meantime, however, litigants should heed Justice Souter’s 
warning: “Beware of the Judge.”41 
                                                                                                                           
[on court orders] is particularly understandable in the context of habeas litigation, where the rules are 
complex and the vast majority of petitioners proceed pro se.”).  I should note that Mr. Bowles was repre-
sented by counsel. 
36  E.g., Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 225 (D. Mass. 2004). 
37  Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381 (2003) (link).  Justice Thomas concurred with part of 
the opinion, including this quoted portion. 
38  See, e.g., Useden v. Acker, 947 F.2d 1563, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Rule 60(b) is an appropriate 
escape valve when counsel has acted diligently and in reliance upon statements of the trial court.”). 
39  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (link). 
40  Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2367.   
41  Id. at 2371. 
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